


Promoting and Developing Social Security Worldwide.

## Example how to apply ISO13849-1/2 (Sistema) including validation Detroit, USA Toronto, Canada


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Functional safety, Dipl.-Ing. Klaus-Dieter Becker












## Validation


Verification and validation are intended to assure conformity of the design of the SRP/CS with the Machinery Directive (regulations).

The proof that each safety-related part of the control system and each of its executed safety functions comply with the requirements of EN ISO 13849-1 shall begin as early as possible during the development, in order to detect and eliminate faults in time.





















# **FMEA : Application** When: In the development, the production and during operation Why: Selection of draft alternatives Consideration of all kinds of failure and their effects Target: Basis for planing the verification and maintenance Basis for reliability analysis



## **FMEA: Fehler Mode Effect Analysis**


- Understand the system
- Divide the system in components
- Analysis of each component
  - How can the component fail?
  - Why can the component fail?
  - What are the consequences of the failure?
  - Follows the failure a safe or an unsafe direction?
  - Is the failure detected?
  - Whereby can the failure be prevented?



Validation of the safety-related parts of the hardware and software functions


- 1. Description of the safety mechanisms
- 2. Fixing the fault reactions
- 3. Hardware FMEA
  - Theoretical
  - Practical
- 4. Software FMEA
  - Theoretical
  - Practical








#### The Easy Method: Risk Analysis by Risk Graph











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



















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















Compo- nents	DC (%)	Estimation
B1	99	Is detected by dynamic signal change if required by the safety function (opening the locked protective device). Plausibility check is realized in both computer systems
B2	99	Is detected by dynamic signal change if required by the safety function (opening the locked protective device). Plausibility check is realized in both computer systems
K1	99	Fault is detected by reading K1 if required by the safety function in PLCA
PLCA	90	Reading G2 in PLCB. Some faults (for ex. faults of the output card etc.) can be detected by reading G2 in PLCA during the normal stop.



Compo- nents	DC (%)	Estimation
PLCB	90	Fault is detected by reading K1 in PLCA
Inverter T1 <sub>FC</sub>	90	Fault is detected if required by the safety function by reading G2 in PLC B. Fault is also detected in PLC A by reading G2 in case of operational stop of the drive
Inverter T1 <sub>Imo</sub>	99	Fault is detected by reading K1 in PLCA if required by the safety function
	1	








MTTF <sub>D</sub> [a]	Kat.3	
	DC <sub>avg</sub> = mit	tel
27	3,70 10-7	С
30	2,65 10 <sup>-7</sup>	d
33	2,30 10 <sup>-7</sup>	d
36	2,01 10-7	d
43	1,54 10 <sup>-7</sup>	d
47	1,34 10 <sup>-7</sup>	d
51	1,19 10 <sup>-7</sup>	d
56	1,03 10 <sup>-7</sup>	d
62	8,84 10 <sup>-8</sup>	е
68	7,68 10 <sup>-8</sup>	е
75	6,62 10 <sup>-8</sup>	е







# Stop if required by the safety function (opening of the protection door)

Systems/ characters	Potentiel faults	Fault detection	Fault reaction	Testing measure
Failure of the personal safety switch B1	Cross circuit, mechanical failure, electrical failure, ground fault	Is detected by dynamic signal change if required by the safety function (opening of the locked protective device). Plausibility check is realized in both computer systems	Stop if detected and restart is prevented	Apply a static signal at the input of both PLCs
Failure of the personal safety switch B2	Contact does not open if the locked protection door is opened (electrical fault or mechanical fault)	Is detected by dynamoc signal change if required by the safety function (opening of the locked protective device). Plausibility check is realized in both computer systems	Stop if detected and restart is prevented	Apply a static signal at the input of both PLCs
Failure of the personal safety switch B2	Spontaneous contact if the locked protection door is in the opened position (for ex. failure of the spring)	Fault is detected in both computers as no signal change has been realized in B1	Restart is prevented	Apply a static signal at the input of both PLCs

As result of the fault detection measures a DC of 99% for B1 and B2 can be given !!!!



Systems / characte rs	Potentiel faults	Fault detection	Fault reaction	Testing measure
Failure of PLCA	Stuck-at-fault in the input/output card or wrong code or complex fault in CPU , preventing that a stop command is sent to the inverter T1a before or during the opening of the protective device	Reading G2 in PLCB . Some faults (for ex. fault in the output card, etc.) can be detected by reading G1 in PLCA during the normal stop. Fault detection is also realized by watchdog function. Other faults by watchdog function	The engine M1 is indirectly stoped with a time delay by PLCB, K1 und T1b. PLC A has the possibility to inform PLB in case of fault detection during the normal stop	Apply a static signal at the stop exit of PLCA
Failure of PLCA	Stuck-at-fault in the input/output card or wrong code or complex fault in CPU , preventing that a stop command is sent to the inverter T1a during the electrical locked protective device is open	Fault cannot be detected by reading G2 as M1 is hold in resting position by T1b in case of an opened locked protective device. Fault detection by the operator when closing the protective device. Some fault can be detected by watchdog function.	Unexpected restart in case of closing the locked protective device. PLCA can inform PLCB about the communication steps.	Send a start command to T1a in the case of an open locked protective device



Systems/ characters	Potentiel faults	Fault detection	Fault reaction	Testing measures
Failure of the inverter T <sub>1FC</sub>	Stuck-at-fault and other internal complex faults in control and power electronics of the inverter, which prevent T1a from stopping the motor before or when the protective device is opened.	Fault is detected if required by the safety function by reading G2 in PLC B. Fault is also detected in PLC A by reading G2 in case of operational stop of the drive.	The engine M1 is indirectly stoped with a time delay by PLCB, K1 und T1b. PLC A has the possibility to inform PLB in case of fault detection during the normal stop	Stop input of the inverter before and during the safety requirement to high potential
Failure of the inverter T <sub>1FC</sub>	Stuck-at-fault and other complex internal faults in control and power electronics of the inverter, which provide a starting command in case of opened locked protective device.	Fault cannot be detected by reading the signal G2 in PLC B as due to the pulse lock a start of the drive cannot be realized Fault detection by the user of the machine when closing the locked protective device by independent start of M1	Drive is held in resting position by PLB and also by K1. If the locked protective device is closed a start is independently made. PLC A can inform PLCB about the fault.	To force a start command in the inverter in case of opened locked protective device

As a result of the fault detection measures a DC of 99% for T1a can be given !!!!



Systems/ character s	Potentiel faults	Fault detection	Fault reaction	Testing measures
Failure of PLCB	Stuck-at-fault in the input/output card or wrong code or complex fault in CPU which prevent that the relay K1 can be switched off by PLCB before or during the protective device is opened	Fault is detected by reading K1 in PLCA	The engine M1 is kept in resting position by T1a and a new start is prevented.	K1 is not switched off
Failure of PLCB	Stuck-at-fault in the input/output card or wrong code or complex fault in CPU which prevent that the relay K1 can be switched off by PLCB in case of opened protective device	Fault is detected by reading K1, if required by the safety function in PLCA Some faults can be detected by the watchdog funtion.	Unexpected start when closing the locked protective device. PLCA can inform PLCB via the communication interface.	Switch K1 when the protective device is opened.



Failure of PLCBStuck-at-fault in the input/output card or wrong code or complex fault in CPU which prevent that the relay K1 can be switched off by PLCB before or during the protective deviceFault is detected by reading K1 in PLCAThe engine M1 is kept in resting position by T1a and a new start is prevented.K1 is not switched offFailure of PLCBStuck-at-fault in the input/output card or wrong code or complex fault in CPU which prevent that the relay K1 can be switched off by PLCB in case of opened protective deviceFault is detected by reading K1, if required by the safety function in PLCAUnexpected start when closing the locked protective device.Switch K1 when the protective device.Some faults can be detected by the watchdog funtion.Some faults can be detected by the watchdog funtion.Switch K1 when communication interface.	PLCB information of the second	nput/output card or wrong code or complex fault in CPU which prevent that the relay K1 can be switched off by PLCB before or during the protective device is opened	K1 in PLCA Fault is detected by reading	kept in resting position by T1a and a new start is prevented.	switched off
PLCBinput/output card or wrong code or complex fault in CPU which prevent that the relay K1 can be switched off by PLCB in case of opened protective deviceK1, if required by the safety function in PLCAwhen closing the locked protective device.the protective deviceVLCBSome faults can be detected by the watchdog funtion.PLCA can inform PLCB via the communicationthe protective devicethe protective device	PLCB inj			Unexpected start	Switch K1 when
	be ca	or complex fault in CPU which prevent that the relay K1 can be switched off by PLCB in case of opened protective	function in PLCA Some faults can be detected	when closing the locked protective device. PLCA can inform PLCB via the communication	the protective device is



## Thank you very much for your attention !

### Wish you much success in integration of safety in design and marketing of machines in European Union





"Everything which is merely possible, is possibly wrong." *René Descartes (1596 – 1650* 

"The first rule a mathematician has to follow is to be exact. The second rule is to be clear and precise and as far as possible simple." *Lazare Nicolas Marguerite Carnot (1753 – 1823)* 

"There are things which seem to be unbelievable to those who have not studied mathematics." *Archimedes (ca. 285 – 212 v. Chr.)* 



## EN ISO 13849-1:2015

### Prinziples of SW-requirements

- For PL a to PL e and Embedded SW as well as Application SW
- Based of generell akzepted SW-design methods
- ... as prevention of faults and defensive coding
- Taken to account, that faults will be done during the specification and the design
- The Prinziples of SW-Standard 61508-3 take as a basis...
- ... but not too much sophisticated
- As far as possible without references to 61508-3
- understandable, applicable und usable



